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ABSTRACT !
The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad 
Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of 
Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note 
Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and 
continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second 
part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual 
understanding of knowledge and his placement of social 
epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of 
“new” knowledge. In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we 
are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of 
Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of 
standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even 
very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we 
propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general 
dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction 
between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. !
Keywords: analytic and continental philosophy, social 
epistemology, knowledge, revisionism, expansionism !
Part I !
Our intention is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević, dealing with 
social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. 
Miščević's text is an example of a problematic, albeit entirely distinctive 
“use” of continental philosophy for “analytic ends.” In addition, our brief 
introduction to the analysis of Miščević's text is an attempt to explain the 
author's take on what is colloquially and ever imprecisely known as  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continental philosophy,  as well as his thematization of the difference 1
between analytic and continental philosophy. These two moves, (1) the 
introduction to the analysis of the text and (2) the analysis itself of the 
text, ought to show the place continental philosophy comprises in 
Miščević's philosophical endeavors. For him, continental philosophy is 
an introduction, leading into real analysis, that is, analytical realism (le 
réalisme analytique)  (what does this mean for the “introduction?”). 2
Further, for Miščević, continental philosophy, ultimately, leads to 
disappointment and should be rejected (is it possible to reject it entirely?). 
In the present article we take Miščević's position or his use and 
application of an author usually included among continental philosophers 
(Michel Foucault), for the purposes of social epistemology. We then 
differentiate it from two other positions on the possible contemporary 
significance of Foucault's theories of power and knowledge for social 
epistemology or social ontology. The first of the two is John Searle's 
position as expressed in his book Making the Social World, which takes 
into account Foucault's theory of power and bio-power without 
significant revision.  The second position is that of Alvin Goldman, who 3
thinks that “continental thinkers,” such as Latour or Foucault, do not 
significantly enrich or advance theories of social epistemology, and 
should therefore, for all intents and purposes, be ignored.  4
Miščević reaches the same conclusion of the insufficiency of continental 
philosophy, but, just like in the later writings of Searle and in contrast to  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 Timothy Williamson (2004, 106-107) writes about the ambiguity of who does and does 1
not belong to continental philosophy, who is and is not a continental or analytic 
philosopher. It seems to us that it was Williamson himself who, in a private conversation, 
suggested that due to problems such as this, Miščević ought to write a book about the 
difference between continental and analytic philosophy. We second Williamson's 
suggestion, and would like to submit this text as our contribution to Miščević's potential 
future project.
 Russell 1911.2
 Searle 2010, 152-155.3
 “People outside of philosophy tend to think of epistemology as abstract, impractical, and 4
remote from the real world. But this need not be so. There are problems of real social 
institutions that cannot be responsibly tackled without an infusion of ideas from social 
epistemology. Many scholars within the humanities assume that only ’continental’ 
thinkers like Foucault or Latour approach epistemology in a manner that interfaces with 
real institutional problems. But that impression need not persist if the project of social 
epistemology as described here is actively pursued. This project preserves continuity with 
traditional epistemology in retaining such classical concepts such as truth, justification, 
and knowledge but also opens the door to a broad range of practical and theoretical 
problems that confront us daily in society and stare us in the face as academic humanists 
or social scientist.“ Goldman 2004, 205. In neither of the two lectures about power 
Goldman delivered at the Collège de France in Paris, in March 2012 (“Troubles for 
Collective Epistemology” and “Democracy, Knowledge and Power”), did he use 
Foucault's texts. 
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Goldman, he retains some faith in certain continental thinkers. 
Ultimately, his rejection of continental philosophy is tinged with 
disappointment. We insist on ascribing Miščević's move–“using,” reading 
and then ignoring continental thinkers' texts–to his philosophical 
beginnings and the first phase of his theoretical work. At the same time, 
we draw special attention to the fact that his “disappointment” in 
continental philosophy and certain continental thinkers, as averred by 
Miščević, is a recurring feature of his philosophical engagement, and 
always accompanies Miščević's thematization of the difference between 
analytic and continental philosophy. Our argument does not refer to the 
examination of Miščević's trust and the game between trust and 
disappointment with continental philosophy, nor is it our intention to 
offer proof of a latent presence or inextricability of continental 
philosophy in the texts and books by Nenad Miščević. It is also not our 
intention to invoke a call for his works to be “measured” and evaluated or 
“deconstructed” through comparison with his earlier texts and books. We 
are exclusively interested in the fruitfulness and justification of his 
perusal of continental thinkers as a necessary preamble to his analytical 
work. Miščević's readings could in that case be paradigmatic, even 
promising. !
1. Introduction !
In the introduction of Real Materialism and Other Essays, Strawson 
discusses his stay in Paris back in 1978, just before beginning his 
doctoral studies at Oxford with Derek Parfit: “I attended the Ecole 
Normale Superieur as an auditeur libre and French government scholar, 
joining Jacques Derrida's Groupe de Recherche pour l’Ensegnement de la 
Philosophie and his seminar for Yale students in Paris – trying (without 
success) to understand what he was talking about.” (Strawson 2008, 9) 
The same year, 1978, when Derrida spent the entire semester teaching 
Freud and Heidegger's understanding of the thing (Ding), Nenad 
Miščević also happens to be among the students (doctoral candidates) 
attending the seminar. But unlike Strawson, Miščević is there for the 
second time (the first time around, in 1973, he also studies with Derrida, 
among others). We now have sufficient information to say that he 
probably left this seminar and his second spell of studies in France with 
the same impressions as Strawson.  Really, such games of unfulfilled 5
expectations and various misunderstandings ought to be put aside, since, 
conversely, Derrida could make his own counter-claims. Namely, Derrida 
spent time in Harvard in 1957, as a so-called special auditor, or a 
recipient of a year long, “Augustus Clifford Tower Fellowship.” Still, in  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 In October of 2004 in Novi list, just after Derrida's death, Miščević scrutinized his 5
memories of seminars in France, saying that he wrote under Derrida's influence for two 
years, and he spoke of his unpleasant surprise during the 1978 seminar.
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contrast to Strawson–without underestimating his months of effort to 
wade through Heidegger and Freud – Derrida's and Miščević's situation is 
quite different.  Even prior to his first stay in Paris, the young Miščević 6
had already published texts about Deleuze, Schelling and Althusser. He 
would continue such work during his second sojourn in Paris–with 
Ricoeur and Derrida this time–publishing translations of Lacan, texts on 
Žižek, Benjamin, Nietzsche. All of this work helped develop his very 
own interesting, and ambitious project about ideology and ideological 
speech.  It seems to us, in light of Miščević's subsequent work in the field 7
of analytic philosophy, that it would be quite simple to define (in three 
easy steps) Miščević's engagement in continental philosophy, which 
lasted some ten years (until 1982–1983), and is still very valuable for 
students of this philosophical tradition (for those who are able to read 
south Slavic languages). 
First, Miščević reads and quotes various “analytic thinkers” in his texts 
from 1977 (Searle, Grice), 1978 (Dummett, Frege, Austin), 1980 
(Davidson, Von Wright, Anscombe). Since he had been working on 
language and theories of discourse from the beginning of his 
philosophical work, and since he is attempting to “mix” directions and 
the sources of his own inspiration, it is rather unfair to characterize his 
early work as strictly “continental,” as it could certainly be equally 
described as “reticently analytical.” In his most original work from this 
period, “Six Functions of Philosophical Discourse,” he is attempting to 
shuffle his cards: he insists that “the analytics of philosophical text could 
learn a lot from poetics, linguistics, even analytical theory of 
law” (Miščević 1978, 173). Regardless of Miščević already being aware 
that there is something in his doctoral dissertation that he terms (names) 
“principle of immanence of exposition” (“In our work, we have 
endeavored to avoid broad reference to philosophers outside the analytic 
tradition, so as not to run afoul of the principle of immanence of 
exposition,” Miščević 1981a, 306),  he not only does not follow this rule, 8
but also justifies his inconsistency thusly: “However, moments we have  
34
 For example, Jacques Derrida, along with Roger Martin, translates the English 6
manuscript of the Quine’s (1964) “Les frontières de la théorie logique.” This text is 
preceded by a text by Nagel (who had just obtained his doctorate at Harvard), also 
translated from the English manuscript, by Derrida's wife, Marguerite Derrida.
 He speaks about this project in an interview with Tomislav Marijan Bilosnić, entitled 7
“Kućni filozof, ideologija, tehnika i ozbiljenje...” [House Philosopher, Ideology, 
Technology and Realization], published January, 1981 in Polja (Novi Sad). Miščević 
(1981b, 21-23).
 This position was transformed many years later in the following way: “Why a text of 8
this sort in an issue of Istraživanja dedicated to analytic philosophy? Because we hold that 
analytic philosophy is continuous with classical philosophy, and is even its legitimate 
inheritor. The realist tradition in particular is close to analytic philosophy, with Brentano 
and Meinong playing a decisive role. Miščević (1999, 445).
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cited, which characterize some of the positive contributions by theories of 
communicational attempts in analytic philosophy, are not without certain 
equivalents in non-analytic philosophizing about language” (Miščević 
1981a, 306). 
The second and third steps in defining Miščević's continental engagement 
are complementary and could describe rather straightforwardly the limits 
and scope of his use of the adjective “continental.” Namely, each 
disappointment in continental philosophy  is also at the same time a 9
reconstruction of the analytic approach and a sobering through analytic 
philosophy (Miščević 1990a, 301-309). Indeed, the disappointment and 
rejection of continental philosophy always implies Miščević's detailed 
thematization of the difference between the analytic and continental 
traditions. Each one of Miščević's disappointments in continental 
philosophy, to the last, results in an identical operation repeated over and 
over, in which he tests his standpoint. (Do we dare claim that Miščević's 
detailed reading of Foucault, analyzed in this paper, along with his 
disappointment, always produces new and unfinished papers/projects 
such as “Philosophizing Without an Argument,” or “The Continental-
Analytic Rift: a Guide for Travellers and Bridge-Builders?”) It seems to 
us that this incessant thematization of the analytic and non-analytic 
approach (in which Miščević is certainly one of Putnam's most faithful 
followers),  and his ultimate resistance to the latter approach, makes 10
Miščević's analysis always more detailed and justified.  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 On the other hand, though, Miščević's disappointments are often multiple: “At the time 9
when I was studying in France (when post-structuralism was at its height), I wrote for a 
while as a faithful follower of post-structuralism. However, I became disenchanted with it 
and started doing analytic philosophy.” Or “In the meantime, a discussion developed 
around Praxis, and is now unfolding in several magazines in parallel. I must say that I am 
deeply disappointed by the course of events.” Miščević (1989, 12-13). In an interview 
with Elvio Baccarini, Miščević repeats these lines. Miščević (1990b, 8-9).
 Hilary Putnam, author of several exceptional texts about Levinas and Franz 10
Rosenzweig, quite often unravelled the nature of continental philosophy and continental 
thinkers in his books and texts. Two of his most successful characterizations, not to be 
found in Miščević, are the following: that French philosophy was at one time certainly 
hypnotized (although no longer) by the connection between texts (“How do texts connect 
with other texts?” Putnam 1999: 61), and that continental “philosophy is conducted above 
all through careful reading of the text”. Putnam (1992, 47).
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Part II 
2. The Duality of Foucault's Position on Knowledge !
In the article “After Foucault: the Reckoning of Social Epistemology with 
New and Old Knowledges” Nenad Miščević analyzes Foucault's dual 
understanding knowledge.  Building on the analysis, he poses the 11
question of social epistemology's stance towards “old” and “new” 
knowledge. On the one hand, says Miščević, Foucault is tied to a 
traditional epistemological position, according to which the acquisition 
and accumulation of knowledge are epistemological virtues, along with 
curiosity, understanding, research and collection of new data on myriad 
topics. Miščević shows a fascinating grasp of Foucault when he 
illustrates to what extent Foucault leans towards the ideal of the scholar 
who fosters a positive passion for knowledge as accumulation of data. He 
describes Foucault's works Folie et déraison and Surveiller et punir as 
“monumental reconstructions of contemporary histories of power,” 
emphasizing that the way in which Foucault meticulously documents 
historical data testifies to the author's search for important hidden truths 
with the aim of accumulating and extracting knowledge. Further, he 
convincingly shows the extent to which Foucault is occupied with the 
importance of gathering evidence and careful argumentation, aware of the 
need to offer the reader rigorous clarity. All this, says Miščević, is 
evidence of Foucault's belief that the epistemic goal is knowledge in the 
so-called “old” sense, and that objective truth is attainable. 
On the other hand, Miščević admits that Foucault often points out that 
knowledge is necessarily a social construction, such that any belief 
cannot at any given time have objective value, whether in the form of 
truth or justified belief. Truth is not sought, researched or uncovered, but 
rather constructed in accordance with multifarious forms of limitations 
and controls of economic and political means. According to Miščević, 
what is also starkly clear in Foucault is a negative passion for a 
deconstruction of knowledge,  and for a subversive attitude towards the 12
idea of objective truth. The neutrality of a viewer or reader is a myth for 
Foucault, since everyone has a “regime” of truth. Given this, all 
knowledge should be deconstructed, and the relations and elements of 
power that underpin its construction shown up. Miščević observes that 
knowledge understood in this “new” sense is in clear contradiction to the 
ideal of scientific truth as understood by its practitioners, which is why 
one can speak of a certain subversion of the scientific position in 
Foucault.  
36
 Miščević 2011.11
 In his text, Miščević systematically uses the word 'deconstruction', which does not 12
appear in Foucault's work, but can be found in Derrida and the early Lyotard. We are 
following his use, with reservations not addressed here.
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However, for Miščević, such a position regarding “new” knowledge, 
although it sounds radical and revolutionary, is also very interesting from 
a cultural perspective. In that sense, Miščević sets up an opposition 
between the scientific and cultural perspectives on knowledge and 
epistemic values.  13
The main thesis of Miščević's article is to show this duality, ignored by 
most of Foucault's readers, to the advantage of emphasizing his 
subversive relationship towards knowledge. Further, he shows that 
Foucault is himself to a certain extent aware of this duality, and is 
attempting to bridge these two passions and ideas in his concept of good 
knowledge of the oppressed. In it, Foucault conceives of knowledge/truth 
as a construct that is determined by relations of power in society, yet is 
not necessarily opposed to the idea of objective truth. Miščević elaborates 
that his perspective as a scholar allows him to see a broader historical 
context and is a good basis for the critique of power and its truths. In this 
way, one can remain subversive towards the bad knowledge emerging 
from power, while at the same time accumulating good knowledge of the 
oppressed. In other words, the morally superior position of the 
marginalized or oppressed allows them to attain a truth about the 
delusions of power, which, coupled with the erudite intellectual, enables 
proper insight into injustice and makes criticism possible.  Finally, 14
Miščević points out that such an understanding of duality and suggested 
reconciliation in Foucault could shed light on ways in which we 
understand knowledge: the concept of “new” knowledge could be a 
useful perspective for a renewed consideration of “old” knowledge. 
Along the way, Miščević places the question and its understanding into 
the space of social epistemology that includes the question of influence of 
society on the process of belief formation (in both the descriptive and 
normative sense). 
However, nowhere in the article does Miščević offer an argument or 
elaborate ways in which social epistemology can and ought to absorb the 
question of “old” and “new” knowledge. On the contrary, he leaves it to  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 Although this topic is beyond the task set in this paper, we consider it important to note 13
that we find this topic about two different perspectives on the nature of knowledge 
particularly interesting: the first is based on the modern (natural) science paradigm, 
whereas the other rests on cultural theories, the sociology of knowledge, social 
constructivism, that is, the postmodern paradigm. Prijić-Samaržija 2011.
 While Foucault holds a version of “standpoint theory” here, Miščević correctly notices 14
that not all “oppressed” knowledge is good just because it is the knowledge of a group 
marginalized by the given configuration of power. Such knowledge too can be 
characterized by stereotypes and prejudices, while others are certainly morally neutral. 
We suppose that the role of the scholar is to assess when the perspective of the oppressed 
shows up the limitations placed by power, and when it is unable to do so due to prejudice. 
If the scholars are indeed the arbiters, the question becomes who actually has a privileged 
position, and can the good knowledge of the oppressed then not be reduced to the 
scholarly (“old”) knowledge?
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the reader to choose between three (or possibly even four) approaches: (i) 
retain the position of “old” knowledge as the only correct approach to 
knowledge, (ii) accept “new” knowledge and abandon the “old” 
approach, (iii) develop a compromised position based on the “good 
knowledge of the oppressed” or advance the concept of old-and-new 
knowledge, and (iv) use a back-and-forth or zig-zag model of alternating 
choice of one position and then the other, taking into consideration the 
goal or context.  Ultimately, Miščević appears to choose a side by 15
ending the article with the sentence: “The model of accumulation of 
knowledge could, in the end, be the most reasonable model.” Since this is 
all, it is clear that Miščević estimates that further elaboration of reasons 
for choosing the “old” knowledge goes beyond the aims of his article.  
Judging by the way in which he debates with Foucault's readers, who 
would present him as a radical advocate of “new” knowledge, there is 
little doubt that Miščević shares Foucault's passion for scholarship and 
the idea of “old” knowledge. However, he finds the idea of “good 
knowledge of the oppressed” also attractive in a certain way. Still, it is 
difficult to judge from the article what Miščević thinks about how 
consistent and undeviating Foucault's theory is as a whole. He restrains 
himself to two theses: (i) the duality of Foucault's positions on 
knowledge, and (ii) that Foucault's positions regarding “new” knowledge, 
which really belong to social epistemology, could be inspiring for debates 
about the nature of epistemology in general. !
*** !
In this article we will endeavor to take up “legitimate” topics and 
positions within social epistemology and question whether Foucault's 
subversive theses about knowledge really belong in both epistemology 
and social epistemology. Further, we will attempt to examine the 
possibility of reconciling Foucault's passions within social epistemology, 
and offer evidence for the following contentions: (i) it is possible to 
absorb Foucault's theses about the influence of the elements of power in 
the acquisition and retention of knowledge within the paradigm of “old” 
knowledge, (ii) the thesis of subverting knowledge or the non-existence 
of objective knowledge/truth/justification is a legitimate position in 
epistemology and outside it to the same extent that any nihilistic position 
is legitimate, and (iii) that the thesis regarding the subversion of 
knowledge cannot be incorporated into “old” knowledge, without lapsing 
into contradiction. Therefore, in opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, 
we are more inclined to characterize Foucault's position about old-and-
new knowledge as contradictory and theoretically unacceptable.  
38
 N. Miščević says that the last approach was suggested to him by Rada Iveković, but he 15
is of two minds about the theoretical viability of this option.
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Moreover, we find that Miščević’s dualist stance reflects his general 
ambivalence concerning “continental” and “analytic” philosophy as we 
briefly elaborated in the introduction. !
3. Purism: Social Epistemology is Not Real Epistemology !
The “old” school of 20th century Anglo-American epistemology bound 
the debates in epistemology chiefly to questions of knowledge, necessary 
and sufficient conditions for knowledge, theories of truth and 
justification, etc. While certain members of the “old” school, such as 
William Alston, even admit that, contrary to widespread belief, 
justification does not correspond to any objective property of belief, this 
traditional approach was most often tied to the assumption of objectivity 
of truth and knowledge. For example, Alston claims that there is no 
“objective property of belief that corresponds to the term ‘justified’ 
” (Alston 2005, 21), since there is no theoretically neutral way to define 
the term 'justification' that would resolve existing debates between 
opposing theories (Alston 2005, 23-25), nor a robust set of paradigmatic 
cases of justified beliefs that could be applied in resolving said debates 
(Alston 2005: 25-26). This, however, is not the case for truth: “the 
acquisition, retention and use of true beliefs about matters that are of 
interest and/or importance is the most basic and the most central goal of 
knowledge” (Alston 2005, 30).  Only those epistemical features of belief 16
that promote the goal of truth can be epistemic desiderata, examples of 
which are: having adequate evidence and grounding belief in adequate 
evidence, formation of belief through a reliable process or generating 
belief through the proper functioning of the epistemological chain, 
forming beliefs in accordance with intellectual virtues, having evidence 
of having adequate evidence, ability to defend a belief, a reliable 
acquisition and retention of belief, coherence and order, etc. (Alston 
2005, 93). We can see that Alston's positions unequivocally correlate with 
Foucault the historian with a passion for acquiring and accumulating 
knowledge. 
However, when it comes to new topics, Alston is still a representative of 
the “old,” conservative school. Questions of influence of social relations 
of power on the formation/construction of belief, and in particular 
questions of deconstructing belief through examining the social influence 
of power, are not topics of “real” epistemology. Because social 
epistemology includes questions regarding the influence of society on the 
formation and acquisition of beliefs, it is not “real” epistemology: 
questions similar to this, according to Alston, ought to be left to 
sociology, social psychology or other sciences (Alston 2005, 5).  
39
 See the review by Feldman 2005.16
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Representative of the purist tradition within “old” epistemology, Alston is 
only one of many who would, without a second glance, reject not only 
Foucault's “new” knowledge, but also any discussion about the influence 
of society on knowledge. Topics in social epistemology in general are not 
epistemological topics, since they are far beyond the normative questions 
of nature and conditions of epistemological success/error. In other words, 
from the purist perspective of those who today defend an accumulation of 
knowledge (objective truth and knowledge), the thesis of Foucault's 
epistemological duality is unacceptable simply because there is no 
epistemological duality. It is simply a question of two different fields: the 
one about the accumulation of knowledge belongs to the domain of 
epistemology, while theories about the subversion of knowledge belong 
to other fields (such as social theory and political action). Consequently, 
from Alston's point of view, Miščević's position about the fecundity of 
Foucault's epistemic duality is on thin ice. 
!
4. Social Epistemology Between “Real” Epistemology and 
Revisionism !
In opposition to Alston's purism about (social) epistemology, most 
contemporary philosophers still think that researching epistemic aspects 
of belief of individuals that occur in relation with others, as well as 
studying epistemic aspects of groups and social systems (interpersonal 
epistemic relations), are indeed part of “real” epistemology. Alvin 
Goldman differentiates three possible approaches to topics of influence of 
society on knowledge: 1. revisionism, which does not belong to “real” 
epistemology, 2. preservationism, which is “real” epistemology, and 3. 
expansionism, expanded but also “real” epistemology.  17
Naturally, the foremost question is what makes a given approach (a topic) 
“real” epistemology? The central aspects of “real” epistemology, 
according to Goldman, are the following: (i) the epistemical subject is 
individual, (ii) epistemology is focused on epistemic evaluation and the 
normative aspect of knowledge, key terms being knowledge, truth, 
rationality, justification etc., (iii) the normative standard of rationality and 
justification is not only conventional and relativistic, but possesses some 
form of objective validity, (iv) knowledge presupposes truth (or is in 
some way connected to truth), which is objective (such that it refers to the 
world independent of ourselves), (v) the central task of epistemology is 
the critical examination of doxastic processes of making decisions 
(acquiring knowledge, retention of knowledge, reevaluation of beliefs 
and other doxastic states).  
40
 Goldman (2010) has a vital role in lending credibility to social epistemology in 17
contemporary epistemological debates.
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Clearly Goldman is attempting to define a social epistemology that 
includes a social dimension to knowledge in “old” knowledge terms. 
Therefore it is unsurprising that Goldman characterizes Foucault's 
position on “new” knowledge as revisionist, claiming that it is in fact not 
“real” epistemology. According to Goldman, postmodernism, 
deconstruction, social constructivism, sociology of knowledge (“strong 
programme”) and similar theoretical initiatives reject many if not all the 
aforementioned basic premises of epistemology. Foucault, thinks 
Goldman, is a revisionist because the thesis about the subversion of 
knowledge is contrary to the central premises of “real” epistemology, 
based on the supposition of existence of objective truth, knowledge, 
rationality, neutrality etc. Goldman mentions Rorty who, putting forth 
theses similar to Foucault's, breathed life into his own positions by 
declaring the death of “old” epistemology and suggesting certain changes 
in the form of studying rules of conversation (conversational mankind).  18
As opposed to the premises of “old” epistemology, the revisionist nature 
of the “new” approach can be clearly seen in claims that truth and facts 
are not in/of the world, but are mere social creations and constructions. 
Knowledge is simply “institutionalized” belief and objective rationality is 
a myth, given that there are no rationalities not influenced by context or 
transcultural norms. In this way, knowledge, as the natural space of 
reason and rationality, is stripped of its epistemic authority. 
It is important to mention that Goldman does not think that relativism is 
the decisive quality that differentiates the “new” approach from the “old.” 
On the contrary, a certain relativism, so-called New Age relativism,  is 19
popular among analytic philosophers who claim that epistemic 
justification is relative depending on the form of assessment, that is, 
relative to the standards that determine what is relevant for assessment 
(contextualism).  Revisionism is not simply a “stronger” or “stricter” 20
relativism, but a qualitatively different position. More precisely, it is a 
kind of epistemological nihilism, such that it claims that there are no facts 
or states of affairs in light of which any position could be judged to be 
better than any other. 
In contrast to revisionism, the other two approaches, preservationism and 
expansionism not only include a social aspect of knowledge, but do so in 
a way that keeps them within “real” epistemology. The preservationist 
approach refers to the already existing topics and debates in (social) 
epistemology, such as the ones involved in doxastic decisions grounded 
in social evidence, processes of acquisition of social evidence, and 
spoken acts and communication. These are legitimate epistemological  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topics by virtue of having all the relevant markers of “real” epistemology, 
among which there is particular emphasis on themes connected to the 
epistemology of testimony, (dis)agreement among experts (peer 
disagreement), attaining rational consensus, the relation of epistemic and 
practical interests in epistemic evaluation, epistemic norms of 
conversational practices and debates (dialectical justification, 
interpersonal justification), etc. Goldman would like to see further 
expansion of the topic of social epistemology and its broadening onto 
topics hitherto considered not part of traditional epistemology. As an 
example, he offers topics such as research of epistemic characteristics of 
groups (collective doxastic agents) and influence of social systems and 
their politics on epistemic results (the legal system, democracy, politics of 
the media, education, etc.). This approach was therefore labeled 
expansionist. 
Generally speaking, “social epistemology” is Goldman's term usually 
designating the social aspect of knowledge within the “old” approach to 
knowledge or within the framework of traditional epistemology. From 
this point of view, much like the previously mentioned purist perspective, 
Foucault's theses about the subversion of knowledge do not belong to the 
domain of epistemology, or even to social epistemology. Foucault's 
position on “new” knowledge is not expansionist, that is, cannot be 
considered as developing old topics through new ones, because the 
proper framework (of “real” epistemology), within which the expansion 
would be legitimate, has been abandoned. 
Foucault's “new” knowledge is new precisely because it does not accept 
the founding premises of “old” epistemology. Which, once again, brings 
us back to the following question: to what extent is Miščević correct in 
his diagnosis of dualism in Foucault's position, and to what extent is there 
simply an irreconcilable epistemological contradiction in Foucault's 
understanding of knowledge. It is also important to note that this 
understanding of a contradiction inherent in Foucault's view of 
knowledge does not depend on the acceptance of either Alston's or 
Goldman's assessment of Foucault's topics as illegitimate. This is a 
contradiction (that objective truth is both possible and not) that cannot be 
reconciled in any coherent epistemology. !
5. Expansion of Social Epistemology Onto Foucault's Topics !
In this section we will try to show how topics of social epistemology can 
be expanded even beyond what Goldman details in his expansionist 
position, and onto so-called Foucault's topics. However, we will show 
that even those cases do not imply epistemological nihilism–the defining 
mark of Foucault's revisionism and his “new” knowledge. 
In contemporary discussions about social epistemology, certain new 
voices have appeared, that are not only ready not to consider Foucault's  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theses seriously (such as a certain methodological nihilism that 
encourages the reexamination of existing “old” positions), but also to 
suggest the broadening of given debates onto Foucault's topics. For 
example, Miranda Fricker underscores the philosophical benefits of 
expanding traditional (individual) epistemological topics onto the field of 
social epistemology.  Studying ethical-epistemological topics of trust 21
and testimony and defining social conditions for the establishment of a 
credible/virtuous knower, Fricker develops a rich conceptual system to 
think about new topics, either not considered or considered only 
marginally within traditional Anglo-American epistemology. Just like 
Foucault, she is interested in how social power is reflected in beliefs. She 
defines social power as possibility held by social agents (individuals, 
groups, institutions), in relation to other social agents, of influencing 
social affairs.  In accordance with the concept of social power, Miranda 22
Fricker is particularly interested in the question of power based on 
identity (identity power), that is, the question of practicing social power 
determined by a collective conception of social identity. For example, the 
collective imagination contains a series of prejudices and stereotypes 
regarding gender identity, which are then reflected in a certain mistrust of 
testimonies and positions held by women. Fricker carefully considers the 
question of epistemic injustice thus committed against women (as well as 
Blacks, the poor or other marginalized groups) in situations in which their 
testimonies are not considered credible/relevant to the extent they would 
be if the system of social power were not what it was. It is an 
epistemological question how social power (tied most intimately with 
collective stereotypes about identity) can produce an epistemic injustice 
in the process of communication, thus missing the goal of the 
epistemological process – acquisition of knowledge.  23
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 Social power is practically socially situated possibility of control of action of others, 22
whether used actively or passively by individual agents, or else practiced purely 
structurally. Fricker understands the justification of the position according to which social 
power is/ought to be a concept of protest, and she especially emphasizes the need for a 
critical modulation of the question of power, but she does tend to use the term power 
mostly in a neutral sense (practicing power/control is not necessarily against any person's 
interest). This makes for a significant difference between Fricker's consistently 
epistemological approach and that of Foucault, whose epistemological perspective is 
mixed with political activism. 
 In the case of testimonies, the hearer uses social stereotypes in assessing the credibility 23
and reliability of the informant, thus always perceiving the informant as a member of 
some social group (whether educational, gender, age, class, racial, religious, regional, 
etc.). The trustworthiness ascribed depends on this identification (in which as a rule, 
prejudices increase or decrease the credibility of the speaker). Epistemic injustice 
committed against the “oppressed” has two principle modalities: testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice. In both cases we are dealing with a source of epistemological and 
ethical damage for the knowing subject.
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Social power can be seen in communicational practice because it 
produces differing forms of dysfunction. As an example, just as it is 
possible to assign to a speaker less credibility than she deserves 
(credibility deficit) – most often suffered by Foucault's “oppressed” – it is 
also possible to assign more credibility to a speaker than is due 
(credibility excess), most often in the case of persons who belong to the 
elite, that is, persons with a privileged education, etc.  Fricker claims 24
that only credibility deficit is a case of epistemic injustice because the 
damage of credibility excess for the privileged elite is not ethically 
serious enough. Although Fricker thinks that epistemic injustices do not 
remain only on an epistemic level, but spread to ethical, economic and 
political injustices committed against the “oppressed,” she quite clearly 
recognizes and separates the intellectual from the ethical virtues in the 
concept of hybrid virtue. As we can see, nothing in the given analysis 
implies epistemic nihilism or conclusions about subversion of 
knowledge. On the contrary, Fricker explicitly locates her position within 
the perspective of epistemic virtue, basing herself on “old” terms for the 
justification of truth and rationality through which she considers 
epistemic practices.  
Analogous to Fricker, if perhaps a bit more radical in expanding social 
epistemology onto Foucault's topics, is Lorraine Code.  Differentiating 25
between “general” and “real” knowledge, she claims that 20th century 
Anglo-American epistemology or so-called old epistemology focused 
wrongly only on a priori necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge in general. Code points out that social epistemology ought to 
include into its field of research all the chaos and incoherence of real 
epistemic relations, consider them critically, descriptively and 
normatively. Code also approaches Foucault's position in the thesis that 
questions of knowledge generate a slew of new questions, many of which 
blur the sharp borders between traditional epistemology and ethical-
political debates. In contrast to purist philosophers such as Alston, Code 
thinks that the object of study of “real” (social) epistemology is less the 
proposition itself, and more the relations and processes of formation of 
belief.  26
Just like Fricker, Code locates the main topics of social epistemology in 
problems such as questions of trust, power, representation and negotiation  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in epistemic communities, in seeking models of epistemic dependence, 
epistemic vulnerability and epistemic risks, etc. In a further consonance 
with Fricker who emphasizes the real dimension of the “situated” 
knower, Code is very critical of the “principle of neutrality” that prohibits 
the consideration of particularity. As opposed to the reductionist 
abstraction and formal analysis of orthodox Anglo-American 
epistemology, Code displaces the focus of study onto the sphere of real 
knowledge, and promotes the need for advocacy, inclusion of 
marginalized/silenced sources of evidence (e.g. in examining the success 
of the scientific methods of health care in Tanzania, one should seek the 
opinions of the Tanzanians). There is no doubt that these theses bring 
Code, much more than other participants in social epistemology, to 
Foucault's “good knowledge of the oppressed,” and the idea of epistemic 
relevance of their perspective. 
Social epistemology in the form of ecological naturalism, as Code calls 
her position, examines the structures and implications of political, 
economic and social systems in a way that does not assume neutrality, 
facelessness or an identity-less knower (stripped of race, class, ethnicity 
or other particularities). She emphasizes the relevance of place and 
situation in which knowledge is produced and circulated, demands 
disclosure of details from which knowledge originates or which limit 
knowledge acquisition. In this comparison, it is difficult to see a 
difference between Foucault and Lorraine Code. However, in contrast to 
Foucault yet similar to Miranda Fricker, Code remains within the realm 
of “real” epistemology. Code clearly establishes her standpoint with the 
claim that knowledge is possible and that we should examine and assess 
the natural and real-world conditions for knowledge. Nor does she think 
that “real knowledge” is not knowledge or that beliefs should not be 
evaluated in terms of justification, rationality or truth. 
Fricker and Code show us that it is possible to further broaden the 
expansionist framework set by Goldman, thus approaching Foucault's 
ideas about knowledge of the oppressed. However, they also show that no 
reconciliation is possible with Foucault's nihilism or subversion of 
knowledge. Both Code and Fricker demonstrate that the possibility of 
expanding topics of social epistemology is considerable, and that drawing 
a scientific and cultural perspective is possible to a greater extent than 
hitherto thought. They also show, on the other hand, that there is a point 
past which one must declare one's opinion and take sides. It is in fact 
Foucault's epistemic nihilism and rejection of the notion of knowledge 
and truth that precludes any kind of reconciliation of “old” and “new” 
knowledge. 
*** !
Let us summarize what has been said. With his scientific approach to 
cultural topics and attempts to “build bridges,” Miščević does both sides  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a lot of good.  We think Miščević is right when he suggests an 27
examination of traditional approaches and possible expansions of (social) 
epistemology onto new topics. He is undoubtedly correct when he reveals 
the potentiality of topics opened up by Foucault with the idea of “good 
knowledge of the oppressed;” yet, he can also be reproached for leading 
the reader on and then stopping short of showing how such and 
“epistemological provocation can be useful.  
However, the crucial question is how correct Miščević is in his diagnosis 
of Foucualt's dual understanding of knowledge. As we have seen, it 
would be more correct to claim one of the following possibilities: (i) 
there is no epistemological dualism – Foucault's nihilist thesis and thesis 
about the “good knowledge of the oppressed,” when he is looking to 
establish a privileged epistemic position for the oppressed, are not at all 
epistemological, but rather belong to other disciplines (e.g. political 
activism and protest, raising awareness and advocating for the rights of 
marginalized groups), (ii) if the theses regarding “new” knowledge, as an 
attempt to reconcile new-and-old knowledge are in fact epistemological 
theses, then there is still no epistemological dualism in Foucault, but 
rather a contradiction, (iii) there is no epistemological dualism because 
Foucault is purportedly an epistemological revisionist and nihilist who, 
however, does not think that epistemic theory and a particular life 
practice are in any way connected. 
Even if Miščević was trying to be gentle in his characterization of 
Foucault by focusing on seeking to build bridges between the “old” and 
“new,” it is still possible to criticize him for uncritically accepting the 
possibility of reconciliation as legitimate. It turns out that reconciliation 
is not possible even when social epistemology incorporates nearly all of 
so-called Foucault's topics, simply because the reconciliation of 
contradictory positions – where objective knowledge at once both exists 
and does not – is not possible.  Moreover, we are inclined to make an 28
even stronger claim, according to which it would be necessary to develop 
a far more critical position towards epistemic consequences issuing from 
the “new” and “new-and-old” knowledge theses. Devaluing epistemic 
standards of knowledge, rationality and justification as mere convention 
without objective value leads to neglect of “old” virtues of epistemic 
responsibility, intellectual virtue and other epistemic desiderata. The 
“counter-knowledge” movement deconstructs all epistemic values under 
the guise of radical critique. 
The new-old dilemma Miščević places before social epistemology is a  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 In that sense we would even be willing to consider the zig-zag strategy. However 28
theoretically unelaborated, in the end, it is merely a pragmatic solution: sometimes it is 
good to apply the criteria of old knowledge, and sometimes the new, without any 
elaboration of contextual reconciliation.
On the Uses of “Continental” Philosophy and Nenad Miščević’s “Disappointment”
dilemma between revision/negation of epistemology and “real” social 
epistemology, a dilemma between counter-knowledge and knowledge. It 
is our contention that Miščević has truly detected and presented what is a 
very complicated predicament for many. In our opinion, for social 
epistemology it would be far more fruitful to show new shades within the 
options of preservationism and expansionism, where we certainly side 
with expansionism (without destruction). !!
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